This is the relevant language from the case of D'Amario v Providence Civic Center Authority (639 F Supp 1538)

In the plaintiff's view, the first amendment is his free pass into the [City] to permit his photographic endeavors to proceed. Any cognizable claim in this regard must, however, prescind from his membership in the fourth estate, invoking the freedom of the press: D'Amario's first amendment right to freedom of speech is not directly implicated.

To be sure, entertainment is a form of protected speech, and the right to disseminate or display photographs is likewise protected. Yet, D'Amario does not claim that the [city] has abridged his right to sell tintypes or to entertain his readership with whatever photographs he may have secured, or that his films have been censored or suppressed. At bottom, he asserts that [the city] has restricted his conduct, thereby limiting his access to the materials which he desires to record photographically. In this context, a court must readily distinguish between expression and action, for only the former is entitled to first amendment protection under the Freedom of Speech Clause.

The activity in which D'Amario seeks to engage does not partake of the attributes of expression; it is conduct, pure and simple. This is not a case where the plaintiff desires to “express” himself by displaying the existing fruits of his photographic endeavors, rather, D'Amario wishes to “do” something, namely, to enter the Center and to photograph subjects of his own choosing while they are performing.

Consequently, despite the anfractuous reasoning utilized by the plaintiff's counsel in an effort to distort the basic shape of the case, the issue before this court is not whether the plaintiff may be restricted from communicating or displaying information he has already garnered. His problem is precisely the opposite: he has come away empty-handed, having been denied license to let his camera rove at will. Seen in its true perspective, the issue is whether a photographer (or photojournalist) may have special rights of access to “information,” that is, to subjects which he desires to photograph. The distinction is a critical one.
I have highlighted (bolded) the relevant sentences. The judge makes a clear distinction between 1-"disseminating and displaying" photos versus 2-getting access and "recording" photos. The first is protected, the second is not.

This langauge can be read narrowly or broadly. If read narrowly, the judge is saying that the unprotected "conduct" is accessing the facility. If that's all, then this case is indeed simply a "right to access" issue and nothing to worry about much.

However, if the judge's language is read broadly, to imply that the unprotected "conduct" is the act of taking photographs as well, .... well, then we're screwed. Note that subsequent cases have interpretted it this way:

Photographing, itself, is conduct with limited First Amendment protection...
(Showalter v. Brubaker 493 F.Supp.2d 752
E.D.Pa.,2007.)